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Long-Term Care Partnerships: Are They Fit 
for Purpose?  
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Long-term care partnership (LTCP) programs were designed to both encourage middle-
income individuals to purchase private long-term care insurance, and defer the time when 
an individual would become eligible for Medicaid to pay her long term care services and 
supports (LTSS). This paper exploits the timing of state Partnership implementation 
(including four pilot states) to evaluate the program’s effects on new yearly insurance 
applications and contract uptake.  We draw upon data from the National Association of 
Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) on new long term care insurance (LTCI) purchases 
(traditional and Partnership) by US state (weighted by the population over age 65 to make 
the data comparable). We use a difference-in-differences strategy to obtain estimates of the 
program effect of the LTCP on the overall uptake of private LTCI, and specifically of 
LTCP contracts and applications for a subsample of states. Findings suggest no significant 
effect of LTCP on insurance uptake and an increase in insurance applications. This result 
points towards  a substitution between traditional and partnership contracts.  
 
Keywords: Long Term Care (LTC) Insurance, LTC Partnerships (LTCP), subsidization, 
Medicaid, difference-in-differences (DD), insurance underwriting.  
JEL: H31, I18, I 38, J14 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Long-term care services and supports (LTSS) encompass a range of services to 
assist people with limited capacity for self-care due to physical or cognitive disability.1  
Expenditures for LTSS can be a significant financial burden to families, and they account 
for more than a third of Medicaid expenditures (Eiken et al. 2014).  There is growing 
concern that as the baby-boomers age many of them will not have sufficient incomes to 
pay for LTSS and will become eligible for Medicaid if they require costly formal LTSS. 
Barely 14 percent of Americans over the age of 50 are covered against the costs of long-
term care needs (Heath and Retirement Study 2012).2   
 
Both the federal and state governments have developed strategies that attempt to shift long-
term care costs away from Medicaid. These include point of purchase incentives, such as 
state and federal tax deductions, for purchasing long-term care insurance (LTCI). However, 
analyses of these strategies indicate limited returns of state tax deductions on the dollar 
(Goda 2011).3 An alternative strategy for increasing LTCI purchases has been incentives 
targeting the point of use. The latter includes strategies that aim to reduce the coverage 
costs and avoid an inefficient spend down of savings to qualify for Medicaid. One such 
approach has been the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Long-Term Care Partnership 
                                                 
1 Most LTSS refers to personal assistance for activities of daily living (ADLs), and includes both medical 
and non-medical care (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 2012). 
2 The costs of LTSS can be catastrophic for the 5% incurring amounting to 260,000 US$. In 2011, the average 
annual cost for nursing home care was over $78,000, while assisted living communities cost an average of 
almost $42,000, $18,000-day care and $30,000 home help (O’Shaughnessy 2012).  
3 The federal tax treatment of long-term care insurance premiums is that they may be counted as deductible 
medical expenses but medical expenses may only be deducted if they exceed 10 percent of a person’s 
income (for people under age 65; for those 65 years of age and older, the threshold for deducting medical 
expenses is 7.5 percent of income through 2016). 
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Program (LTCP) initiative. This strategy allows people to sequester a portion of their assets 
– equivalent to the value of a special LTCI policy – from Medicaid requirements that they 
spend all of their assets (other than their home or car) before becoming eligible for 
Medicaid coverage. It was originally implemented in four states4 (with heterogeneous 
designs) but starting in 2005 it was extended to most US states after a decade moratorium 
(see Appendix D for dates of inception). In this paper we exploit primarily the LTCP 
extension. More specifically, after 2005, 36 additional states created LTCP programs, 
which have been more homogenous, and hence the short-term effects of LTCP can be more 
clearly identified.  In addition to spreading the financial risk of LTSS needs and reducing 
Medicaid costs (of individuals who spend down to qualify for Medicaid eligibility), the 
LTCP programs attempted to increase private LTCI coverage by linking the purchase of 
specific LTCI policies to special eligibility rules for accessing Medicaid benefits. 5  
However, they did not address the issue of insurance underwriting, where individuals apply 
and are denied coverage despite being willing to pay the insurance premium.  
 
To date, there have been limited evaluations of the LTCP that draw upon econometric 
techniques. Lin and Prince (2013), using the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), examines 
the effects of a state adopting a LTCP, and find only modest effects on total LTCI uptake.  
Greenhalgh-Stanley (2014) draws upon data from the HRS and finds similar results except 
when a sample of highly risk-averse and forward-looking individuals is evaluated. 
                                                 
4 The LTCP programs were initially developed in four states (California, Connecticut, Indiana, and New 
York – with variations among the four) in the early 1990s, with grants from the Robert Wood Johnson 
Foundation (RWJF). 
5 There has been considerable literature – which we substantiate later in the text – devoted to the effect of 
Medicaid as an implicit tax on long-term care insurance. The Partnership program has been conceived as a 
potential solution that groups both public and private insurance entitlements, which could plausibly 
eliminate the so-called implicit tax on Medicaid 
 4 
However, the empirical identification of both studies is limited by the biannual data of the 
HRS, which bundles together the introduction of LTCP in different states. The HRS only 
surveys 36 states and ideally, one would expect to have data for all years and observations 
for every US state. Furthermore, the HRS only identifies individual insurance subscription 
at the time of the interview but not yearly new contracts, which requires supply side data.6  
Similarly, Lin and Prince (2013) do not take account of the heterogeneous partnership 
penetration among partnership states. Importantly, one would expect differences between 
those states that adopted the program in the 1990s (RWJF states) and the states that did so 
after 2005.  Finally, the HRS does not include data on applications for LTCI and does not 
have information on contract details, which remain in the error term. In contrast, our study 
accounts for purchases, and allows us to distinguish Partnership and non-Partnership 
contracts in the early adopting states. 
 
In this paper, we contribute to the following question: how did Partnership 
programs affect the number of applications filed for long-term care insurance policies? We 
primarily draw upon data from the National Association of Insurance Commissioners 
(NAIC) on new LTCI purchases (traditional and Partnership) by US state (weighted by the 
population over age 65 to make the data comparable). We then use a difference-in-
differences strategy to obtain estimates of the program effect of the LTCP on the overall 
uptake of private LTCI, and specifically of LTCP contracts and applications for a 
subsample of states. We further adopt a flexible difference in differences (DD) 
specification that allows separating the pre-existing trends in the market for LTCI from the 
                                                 
6 As we show below, there is wide variability in the uptake of LTCP over time, and some states show a 
poor uptake, which makes the assumption of all states adopting a LTCP scheme quite heroic.  
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LTCP effect. In addition, we employ different subsamples and specification to provide us 
with a placebo and robustness checks. Our findings broadly indicate modest to no evidence 
of any robust effect of the LTCP on LTCI uptake overall. We find that there was an 
expansion of total LTCI contracts only in the year when a state implemented a LTCP 
program, which indicates some level of substitution between traditional and partnership 
contracts. Finally, there is some evidence of an effect on applications, which is consistent 
with the presence of insurance underwriting, that is, the estimation of the expected 
profitability, and recommended converage of insuring each new applicant. 
 
The plan of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we describe the market for 
LTCI and the Partnership program. In section three, we discuss the data and our 
econometric strategy for analyzing the data.  We then report our results and different 
robustness and other checks in section four, and conclude with a discussion of the results’ 
policy implications in the final section. 
 
2. BACKGROUND 
  
2.1 The Market for Long-Term Care Insurance 
 
Private LTCI was first offered in the United States in 1974 but it was not until the 
late 1980s that the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) issued a 
model act for LTCI establishing minimum standards and practices for companies selling 
LTCI as well as regulations for state insurance commissioners (Society of Actuaries 2014). 
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Since then, demand for LTCI has remained anemic despite the consumer safeguards 
embodied in the NAIC’s initial and subsequent adoption of standards for LTCI (Somers 
and Merrill 1991). Given the small number of Americans over age 50 who hold policies, 
the LTCI market is only a fraction of its potential size (Stoltzfus and Feng 2011; AHIP 
2012).7   
The theoretical and empirical evidence indicate that price and affordability are 
strong factors in individuals’ decision to purchase long-term care insurance (Robert Wood 
Johnson Foundation 2014). Contributing to suggestions that LTCI is not for everyone, the 
NAIC discourages consumers from buying a policy if premiums account for more than 7 
percent of their income or if they have less than $100,000 in assets (excluding the value of 
a home) (Society of Actuaries 2014).8 Moreover, many people believe that Medicaid is 
available to cover LTSS costs (creating what is known as Medicaid crowd-out), and that 
Medicare covers more of the costs of LTSS than it actually does. Further, because a number 
of large LTCI insurers stopped selling policies after 2008, there are well-founded concerns 
that LTCI companies may not exist by the time an individual might need to use a policy.  
 
2.2 The Partnership for Long-Term Care 
The Partnership program promotes the purchase of private long-term care insurance 
by offering policyholders access to Medicaid under special eligibility rules regarding asset 
levels (Meiners et al. 2002; Bergquist et al. 2015). Cost-effectiveness is a key rationale 
                                                 
7 Norton (2000) provides summary explanations for a limited market for LTCI, including adverse selection, 
moral hazard, Medicaid crowd out, high administrative costs, and the long period between purchase and pay 
out.  
 
8 In the years our data cover (the early 2000s), the NAIC discouraged people from purchasing LTCI if the 
value of their assets was less than $35,000 (Kaiser 2006; Feder et al. 2007).  
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behind the Partnership program. Proponents of the program believe it can reduce Medicaid 
spending in the future by creating an incentive for individuals to assume responsibility 
through LTCI for at least the initial phase of their need for LTSS (Rothstein 2007). It is the 
inter-twining of private insurance with a public program that makes it a public-private 
partnership program. The goal is to attract individuals who might not otherwise purchase 
private LTCI, so that if they need formal LTSS the insurance will pay at least their initial 
LTC costs and thereby reduce the amount Medicaid otherwise would have spent for their 
LTSS (Stone-Axelrad 2005; Meiners 2009).  
 
The LTCP is a strategy to promote private LTCI purchases and reduce Medicaid 
expenditures in the future. But for this to occur, LTCP needs to alter historical trends in 
purchases of LTCI and attract middle-income individuals who otherwise might not believe 
they can afford LTCI. Further, if people who already are purchasing traditional LTCI 
choose to shift to the Partnership policies, contract substitution will occur and one would 
expect Medicaid expenditures not to decline. Thus, the overall effect of the LTCP is 
ambiguous. Although the Partnership plans were intended to appeal to middle-income 
individuals, there are no income restrictions or eligibility criteria regarding who may 
purchase a LTCP policy. In addition, they did not address the traditional problems of LTCI 
(Norton 2000; Barr 2010); specifically, uncertainty about future costs of LTSS, large 
administrative costs, insurance lapses due to premium increases over time, and the 
existence of insurance underwriting.  
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The RWJF initiated its Partnership program demonstration in 1987 and, as noted, 
the initiative led to four states implementing Partnership programs: California (1994), 
Connecticut (1992), Indiana (1993), and New York (1993) (Alper 2006). These state 
programs are referred to as the RWJF Partnership programs. Table A1 in the Appendix 
provides an overview of the different LTCP policy models that were developed in the 
RWJF programs and then evolved during their first dozen years of operation.9   
  
The dollar-for-dollar model originated in California, Connecticut, and Indiana, and 
was adopted by New York in 2006 (Meiners et al. 2002; NYSPLTC 2011).10 The dollar-
for-dollar approach enables people to buy a policy that offers a specified dollar amount of 
services and protects that same amount of assets from eligibility determination for 
Medicaid coverage of LTSS. Insurance payments for long-term care are considered the 
equivalent of spending or divesting assets to establish Medicaid eligibility.11  The dollar-
for-dollar model is meant to be attractive to people with modest incomes because the 
limited coverage of the policy might be viewed as unaffordable without the asset 
protection. People with modest resources may also find dollar-for-dollar plans appealing 
                                                 
9 Table B in the Appendix provides a summary of results from earlier studies of the RWJF programs. 
10 New York initiated the “total asset protection” policy model in its LTCP, and Indiana added it as an option 
in 1998 (ILTCIP 2011). The New York policies are required to pay for three years of nursing home care or 
six years of home care, or some combination of the two. A policyholder who exhausts these benefits does 
not have to spend any remaining assets before being eligible for Medicaid to pay for LTSS; such assets are 
protected under the terms of the total asset protection model. Thus, it provides a strong incentive to purchase 
long-term care insurance. The program is targeted more to middle and upper-income people as an alternative 
to transferring assets to become Medicaid eligible (Meiners et al. 2002; Rothstein 2007).  
 
11 Indiana added a total asset protection option to the dollar-for-dollar model in 1998; it operates such that 
up to a threshold amount of coverage (the dollar equivalent of the cost of four years in an average Indiana 
nursing home), the policyholder is eligible for dollar-for-dollar asset protection when determining 
eligibility for Medicaid benefits. But a person also can purchase a partnership LTCI policy that provides 
protection for costs above the dollar-for-dollar threshold. Anyone who does that receives total asset 
protection along with Medicaid benefits when they exhaust their policy benefits (Meiners et al. 2002). 
 
 9 
because they are more likely to overinsure their assets (buy insurance to protect more assets 
than they actually have, and hence  saving Medicaid money) than people with greater 
resources (Meiners 2009). Participants must have LTSS expenses that reach their chosen 
policy maximum benefit before they can qualify for Medicaid, so holding a Partnership 
policy generally entails a limited amount of self-insurance and out-of-pocket spending 
(Meiners 2009). Policyholders who die before or while receiving policy benefits represent 
potential savings to Medicaid. 
 
Shortly after the four RWJF states established their Partnership programs, Congress 
passed a law effectively prohibiting other states from creating their own Partnership 
programs. It was concerned that the LTCP would not save Medicaid money especially 
given the heterogenenous uptake of partnership programs in exhibited in Tables C1 and C2 
. By the early 2000s, it was clear that federal and state Medicaid costs were rising due to 
LTSS expenditures.  Congress passed the 2005 Deficit Reduction Act, which included a 
provision permitting all states to implement Partnership programs (this provision remains 
in effect today). As of November 2013, 36 states had implemented Partnership programs 
(Truven Health Analytics 2013). All new programs are required to use the dollar-for-dollar 
model.  
 
Timing remains an issue for any evaluation of the Partnership programs because 
there is generally a lag between policy purchase and benefit payout. This is more important 
regarding the cost-effectiveness and Medicaid budgetary impact than it is for determining 
the programs’ effects on LTCI market size (Meiners et al. 2002; Meiners 2009; Ahlstrom 
 10 
et al. 2004). Assessments of the Partnership programs’ budgetary impact have different 
conclusions. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) assumed that the 
program is at least budget neutral, with opportunities for savings because it provides an 
alternative to transferring assets and because income from protected assets can be applied 
to the cost of care (Meiners 2009). A Government Accountability Office study (GAO 2007) 
study found that Medicaid savings were not likely but that costs to Medicaid would be 
minimal because it assumed that many participants would still be too wealthy to qualify 
for Medicaid. The GAO study also assumed that policyholders do not over-insure their 
assets, which are a major source of potential savings, and it assumed that people do not 
often transfer their assets to qualify for Medicaid (GAO 2007; Meiners 2009).  
 
 
3. DATA AND EMPRIRICAL STRATEGY 
 
3.1 Data 
Our analysis of the Partnership programs’ effects differs from earlier assessments because 
we take advantage of a dataset containing comprehensive data available on LTCI policies.  
It was constructed for the purpose of examining total and Partnership sales of private LTCI 
policies by state, and covers the time period 2000 to 2008.  The data include information 
(for each state) on all newly purchased LTCI contracts each year, average premiums, GDP 
per capita, Medicaid expenditure per capita, population information by age and sex, as well 
as all newly purchased Partnership contracts and applications for the RWJF states and 
various summary statistics and demographic information. Appendix C contains a full list 
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of details on the dataset and variable construction. Table 1 provides a description of the 
key variables used, with the total number of LTCI contracts (traditional and Partnership) 
per one million people age 65 and older in logs, and Partnership contracts and applications 
per one million people age 65 and older in logs. The number of contracts by population 
over age 65 is weighted simply to make the data comparable across states.12 We distinguish 
four groups of states and time in Table 1: the four states that introduced LTCP initially 
(RWJF states) and the other states (non-RWJF states) for time periods 2000-2004 (before 
the option of implementing a LTCP was extended to all states) and 2005-2008 (see 
Appendix D for dates of inception).  Overall, the estimates on the number of contracts for 
different sub-periods indicate no significant differences in the uptake of contracts.  
 
Note that our main focus of analysis is the total number of LTCI contracts in a given state. 
We focus on the total number of contracts because the potential exists for some substitution 
between traditional and Partnership contracts, which would not be captured by examining 
only Partnership contracts. However, we do provide a separate examination of traditional 
and Partnership policies in just the RWJF states as the data were available to us. Thus, note 
also that we examine “satisfied demand” but not unmet demand for both types of LTCI 
policies; our analysis does not include potentially wider demand of those who were 
underwritten by insurance companies or insurance agents and denied policies or quoted 
very high premiums due to the underwriting.13   However, we include the number of 
applications for the Partnership programs in the RWJF states to be able to disentangle some 
                                                 
12 However, trends are comparable when the number of contracts was not weighted. 
13 Although it is common practice to equate demand and insurance uptake (e.g., Sloan and Norton 1997), 
the latter might not necessarily apply. 
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evidence of the effect of individuals underwritten by insurance companies. We also have 
data on total Medicaid expenditures and the number of claims for LTSS.14  
 
 
[Insert Table 1, Figure 1, 2 around here]  
 
Figure 1 contains the numbers of Partnership policies purchased and applications per one 
million people over the age of 65 in the each of the RWJF states. The number of Partnership 
policies purchased follows declining trend beginning in 2003, which then flattens out in 
2005 to the initial trend and picks up in 2008 suggesting a potential knock on effect from 
other states. Figure 2 shows the total number of insured lives (combining traditional and 
Partnership contracts) for both Partnership and non-Partnership states, which suggest a 
very similar trend. 15  Importantly, we find comparable trends throughout the period 
consistent with the descriptive data analysis. So we can conclude that there are no clear 
differences in trends of purchases of LTCI in our data.  
 
Our identification strategy relies on a difference-in-differences approach where we define 
an intervention variable for the states that were able to implement a LTCP program after 
2005 to capture the causal effects of the program (excluding the four RWJF states). Second, 
we measure the “exposure” to LTCP for the RWJF states that implemented the program 
                                                 
14 We are able to observe the number of policies purchased, the number of Partnership applications and the 
number of Partnership applications denied in each RWJF state. 
15 There are no yearly data for Connecticut in 2000. The total sales in 2007 in New York are an estimation 
based on Q1 and Q2 figures.  
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before 2000 to examine potential long-term trends in the program.16 We analyze data from 
2000, taking advantage of the progressive implementation of the LTCP models over time. 
Because there are no publicly available individual level datasets that allow us to identify 
whether an individual purchased a Partnership policy, we have relied on aggregate data on 
the number of LTCI contracts per state (both traditional and Partnership), along with data 
on Medicaid expenditures and claims for the study period. Our study complements earlier 
evidence by examining the long-term effect of the four original Partnership states (RWJ 
states) and the immediate short-term effects of the Partnership programs implemented after 
2005. Specifically, we address the question of whether the progressively evolving market 
for private LTCI, which followed a pre-LTCP trend, might have been modified by the 
growth in the number of Partnership programs.  
 
Our dataset includes a number of different control variables. In particular, we consider the 
size of the market and how concentrated it is by including the total number of LTCI policies 
purchased, the number of companies earning premiums, the state income per capita, 
average LTCI premium (note we cannot distinguish the traditional and Partnership policy 
premiums), and total state population. Figure 3 plots the evolution of average premiums 
for states that implemented LTCP and non-LTCP programs. Premium trends are 
comparable across the states that have LTCP and those that do not, and indicate that only 
after 2005 the premiums for partnership contracts seem to have increased.  
 
3.2 Empirical Strategy 
                                                 
16 In some robustness checks we run the analysis for the subsample excluding New York, which is the only 
state that does not follow a ‘dollar-for-dollar’ model. 
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Early studies of the LTCP programs focused primarily on their sales relative to potential 
buyers and the programs’ budgetary impact on Medicaid (Meiners et al. 2002). As noted, 
two previous studies employ the HRS data but the authors assume that expansions in 
insurance uptake are attributed to the Partnership programs (Lin and Prince 2013; 
Greenhalgh-Stanley 2014), which does not appear to have played out after implementation 
(see Appendix C). Moreover, it is not possible with the HRS to differentiate Partnership 
and non-Partnership polices. We are similarly limited in our ability to distinguish between 
traditional and Partnership policies, but for the original RWJF states we can differentiate 
the two types of contracts and examine Partnership applications during the study period.  
 
To our knowledge there are no studies that perform a subsample econometric analysis of 
the LTCP specifically. Importantly, as Figure 2 shows, the Partnership LTCI contract 
development was similar to that of private LTCI: sluggish market penetration, with 
substantial declines in sales in both 2004 and 2007.17 The latter confirms the hypothesis 
that LTCP exhibit comparable market penetration barriers as traditional contracts. One of 
the difficulties in examining effects of programs such as LTCP using a difference–in-
differences methodology is that one needs to separate pre-existing trends from the dynamic 
effects of a policy change. The LTCP might be subject to state specific effects, which could 
be captured easily, but the development of the policy itself might give rise to a shift in the 
pre-policy trend.  To address this concern, we control for time specific effects (triple 
                                                 
17 There were several contributing factors to the large decline in 2004, including general consumer 
perception of rate increases, rate stability regulation, and the exit of insurers CNA and AEGON from the 
industry, which is likely responsible for much of the decrease (Society of Actuaries 2005). The lower sales 
in 2007 and 2008 also may be attributed to rising premiums and more insurers exiting the market. 
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interaction effects) in purchases of total LTCI policies and Partnership policies, Medicaid 
expenditures and claims for LTSS. We supplement our analyses with a description of the 
characteristics of Partnership versus non-Partnership states. In our  empirical strategy  we 
exploit  the variation from differences in partnership implementation across states and over 
time, where we define an intervention variable for the states that were able to implement a 
LTCP program  (whichhas a value of zero in non-Partnership states.)18  All specifications 
have been estimated using STATA 14. 
 
The specification that we primarily utilize is the following: 
 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛿𝐿𝑇𝐶𝑃𝑖 + 𝛾𝐿𝑇𝐶𝑃𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜁𝜑𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡          (1) 
 
 
where (as in Table 1) 𝑌𝑖𝑡 can either refer to the log of total (including Partnership) LTCI 
policy sales per one million people age 65 or older, or to the log of total Partnership 
applications (including approved policies) per one million people age 65 or older (in RWJF 
states only). We define a variable ‘LTCP’ which is state and time specific to identify the 
states i (those implementing LTCP programs) in a given point in time t, and another 
variable ‘POST’ to refer to the period post treatment given that some states has already 
LTCP before 2005 (see Appendix D for date of inception) so that the coefficient of the 
interaction between the treatment and the post treatment period (𝛾) refers to the estimate 
                                                 
18 Table D2 in the Appendix reports the regression results assuming a standard difference-in-differences 
model without a trend interaction. 
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of the program effect of being a Partnership state on the dependent variable of interest. The 
vector 𝑋𝑖𝑡 refers to a set of potential characteristics where treatment and control states can 
differ (and are likely to influence the uptake of insurance). Specifically, we identify total 
and age specific population groups, as well as state per capita income (GDP); the number 
of insurance companies operating in each state, the size of the insurance market 
(NLTCI65), which can influence the number of policies purchased in each state. Given that 
the coefficient is likely to overestimate the effect in the presence of strong pre-trends, we 
include a variable time trend to capture such an effect and we specify a flexible structure 
of time specific effects, and a linear trend ( ).  
 
We have estimated several different specifications with and without state fixed effects. 
Specifically, in fixed effect specifications, 𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 𝜎𝑖 + 𝜂𝑖𝑡  where 𝜎𝑖  reflects systematic 
variations by state that are constant over time. For instance, it accounts for those 
unobserved effects that are state specific – e.g., state specific insurance preferences or 
nursing home regulations. In alternate specifications the error term refers to an 
idiosyncratic effect 𝜂𝑖𝑡.  
 
In addition, given that the effect of LTCP might be heterogeneous over time, some 
specifications allow for a flexible interaction between time specific effects and Partnership 
policies (LTCP). Finally, we conduct some important robustness checks, a placebo test (by 
estimating the effect for a period before LTCP were implemented in non- RWJ states) and 
we experiment with varying the time trends. The parameter of interest is the value of 𝛾, 
j t
 17 
which captures the difference-in-differences estimator of the introduction of LTCP on the 
different dependent variables of interest.  
 
All specifications provide robust standard errors when non-clustered. The baseline 
specifications are estimated by OLS, though alternative specifications use GLS. However, 
the number of observations (N) may not be large enough relative to the number of time 
periods to permit the first order asymptotic approximation to be sufficiently precise to 
provide an accurate inference.  If this is the case, we should not observe significant 
differences between least squares (OLS) and generalized least squares (GLS) coefficients. 
Given that the observations are not independent due to the correlation of insurance 
contracts within states, we chose to use both approaches to account for potential different 
distributional assumptions.  
 
Including the set of control variables (Xit) is important because each relates to potential 
explanations for differences in the expansion of the number of contracts. Each of these 
variables is combined with state-specific effects. To take advantage of the panel nature of 
the data, we clustered by state and estimate a random effects specification. The motivation 
for this approach is to control for unobserved state-specific effects that are constant over 
time. Empirically, the null hypothesis of the Hausman test is generally rejected (𝜒2 =
21.60), which confirms the use of fixed effects rather than random effects estimation. We 
estimate a series of regressions with overall sales per person 65 and older as the dependent 
variable, and then a series with total Partnership sales and applications for Partnership 
policies as the dependent variable. 
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3.3 Roadmap 
 
The empirical strategy presented below consists of running difference-in-difference (DD) 
models which make up our baseline specifications. Given the limited number of controls 
available, we estimate fixed effects models in addition to the OLS ones.  Our goal is to 
establish whether the introduction of LTCP increased the number of LTCI contracts. Then 
we examine whether the effect is year specific and whether it varies when we exclude 
RWJF states given that LTCP programs were initially introduced in only four states before 
1994. Finally, we estimate similar estimates for insurance applications. If the coefficient 
of LTCP is significant and positive for applications and not contracts purchased, it will 
signal an essential effect of underwriting. 
 
4.  RESULTS 
 
We begin our results discussion by reporting the baseline estimates of specification (1) 
allowing two different definitions of time trends. We first report the model using a flexible 
specification with time specific effects (which we draw upon below) and then with a linear 
time trend.  Table 2 shows the effect of a Partnership program state on the total number of 
LTCI policies purchased in a given state. We are interested in the evolution of the 
coefficient LTCP after the implementation of the Partnership program, controlling for time 
specific effects and a number of controls. Table 2 reports evidence of a significant DD 
coefficient, suggesting that when a specification without controls is estimated the effect is 
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actually negative both for OLS and fixed effects, and suggesting a reduction of 15% of the 
insurance contracts relative to the elderly population in a given state.  However, this effect 
is mainly driven by the extent of competition, given that the inclusion of the number of 
companies renders the DD coefficient insignificant. Competition we believe is an 
important covariate insofar as it drives marketing efforts to disseminate the partnership 
insurance as an insurance product.  Importantly, we find no difference in the effect when 
the trend is linear or non-linear. However, given the clear non-linearities in year specific 
effects, the non-linear trend specification cannot be ruled out, and fixed effects coefficients 
actually suggest evidence of a negative effect. 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
Table 3 displays the effect of the state exposure to the Partnership programs on total LTCI 
uptake using a flexible time specific triple interaction format (for non-RWJF states). 
Indeed, the DD now includes time specific effects for the period after the introduction of 
LTCP. Our preferred specification is a state-fixed-effects model, both for conceptual 
reasons and because time-constant unobserved characteristics are a potential source of bias 
as our statistical tests confirm. Table 3 contains estimates of the DD for non-RWJF states 
considering the effects for the different post treatment years for both OLS and fixed effects 
estimates for our preferred baseline specification.  
 
When the effect is broken down by year and fixed effects included, we find a modest 
positive effect of the program in 2006 and 2007 that is offset by a negative effect in 2008. 
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Indeed, although there was an increase of 31% in the number of contracts, we find a similar 
effect with opposite sign in 2008 (the comparator year). These results are suggestive of 
individuals substituting from traditional LTCI policies to Partnership policies. The 
statistical test of joint significance of the overall effect lead us to reject the hypothesis of 
an overall significant effect, consistent with the results in Table 2. An alternative 
interpretation includes some form of strategy where individuals drop their policies (lapses), 
especially in the context of troubling economic indicators in 2007. Further, the stock-
market crash in 2008 might have exerted a negative effect on purchases in states that 
implemented LTCP plans after 2006. We have controlled for state GDP, which should 
partially capture such an effect, especially under the fixed effects specification.  
 
 
Next, Table 4 reports the results when the model is specified by sub-periods for non- RWJF 
states. This is important, as it should provide a test for the validity of previous results.  
Further, examining the effect of LTCP prior to 2004 for non–RWJF states can serve as a 
placebo analysis of our results since it analyzes the LTCP states in a period before the 
implementation of the program.  Again we find no robust evidence of an effect irrespective 
of the period examined.  We also examine penetration of the Partnership programs over 
time and the effect on sales and applications in the early adopting states for a longer period 
than the uptake of Partnership insurance contracts, and find a positive and significant 
increase (Appendix C). Hence, we conclude that the results appear to be robust to the 
inclusion of controls, and the different specifications and placebo tests.  
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Finally, Table 5 includes results examining the increase in Partnership policy purchases 
and applications for the sample of states where we observe applications in addition to 
purchases.  Our findings show that least squares estimate an approximate increase of 28% 
in new Partnership applications (which includes purchased contracts) for the smaller 
sample of states where we also observe insurance applications.  The results are consistent 
with the presence of some insurance underwriting for LTCP contracts that counteracted 
the potential increase in contract uptake.  
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
5. Discussion 
  
Our findings indicate that although indeed LTCP managed to increase the number of LTCI 
applications by an average of 8% among a subsample of states, they did not exert an 
influence on insurance uptake and a fixed effects specification suggests no or even negative 
effects.  We interpret this result as suggesting a moderate effect of LTCP design on 
insurance applications but no effect on actual purchases, indicating also that LTCP did not 
mitigate the practice of insurance underwriting. Finally, we find evidence that the 
availability of LTCP led to a one-off contract substitution from traditional LTCI contracts 
to LTCP contracts. Hence, the total effect on contract uptake was negligible. That is, the 
design of LTCP did not change the traditional barriers in the access to long-term care in 
the United States (Costa-Font et al. 2015), especially affordability and underwriting. 
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Limited growth of LTCI seems likely due to the poor targeting of the LTCP to middle-
income individuals together with poor information and marketing campaigns about the 
programs, as well as underwriting issues (Alper 2006; Bergquist et al. 2015). When we 
examine applications rather than contracts in RWJF states, there is some evidence of 
underwriting practices which indicate that the practice of risks selection which is common 
in the insurance industry could explain limited success of Partnership contracts. Finally, it 
is possible that some consumers failed to identify the additional advantage of Medicaid’s 
role in the insurance contract which could partially explain why Partnership sales are not a 
higher percentage of overall LTCI sales, particularly in New York and California, which 
have been less proactive about consumer education (Connecticut Partnership for Long-
Term Care, 2008).  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Drawing on a unique dataset from the National Association of Insurance Commissioners 
(NAIC) we have examined whether the introduction of a Partnership program (LTCP),  
which was originally designed to expand take-up of LTCI policies, manage to attained its 
goal. This is important because insurance uptake would reduce the likelihood of 
Medicaid spend down among middle-income individuals. However, the LTCP also could 
have induced a substitution of policies for traditional LTCI contracts. Our findings imply 
LTCP did not stimulate the uptake of LTCI. We interptret the results as suggestive that 
LTCP did not address the most pressing constraints to the purchase of LTCI, namely 
underwriting, affordability, and consumer myopia. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics and Variable List 
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Variable Description Type RWJF 
States, 
2000-2004: 
Mean 
(S.D) 
Non-
RWJF 
States, 
2000-
2004: 
Mean 
(SD) 
RWJF 
States, 
2005-2008: 
Mean (SD) 
 
Non-
RWJF 
States, 
2005-2008: 
Mean (SD) 
 
All States, 
2000-2008 
Dependent 
Variables 
  
     
NLTCI65it 
Number of 
newly 
insured 
lives per 
one million 
people age 
65 and 
older  
 
Continuous 
 
 
14,404. 
(3,877) 
16,191 
(10,885) 
14,996.56 
(7,098) 
17,181.28 
(17,685) 
16,477.13 
(13,821) 
LTCPAit 
New 
partnership 
policies and 
applications 
per one 
million 
people age 
65 and 
older in 
RWJ states 
Continuous 
11,980 
(7,247)  
- 
- 
8,858 
(4,225) 
- 
- 
1,0603 
(6,221) 
Treatment 
Variables 
  
     
LTCPit 
Dummy 
variable; 1= 
Partnership 
state 
(RWJF or 
Expansion) 
Binary 
1 
- 
- 
- 
1 
-       
0.489 
- 
0.529 
- 
Controls        
NComit 
Number of 
companies 
earning 
premiums 
or paying 
out benefits 
Continuous 
43.15 
(12.180) 
40.264 
(12.240) 
48.063 
(13.359) 
50.277 
(13.049) 
44.763 
(13.469) 
GDPit 
 
Per capita 
real GDP 
(chained 
2005 
dollars)  
 
 
Continuous 
45,352.4 
(6,420.186) 
40,591.78  
(15,219.1) 
49,238.5 
(7,503.883) 
43,404.54 
(17,133.43)  
42,252.69 
(15,679.13) 
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Figure 1. Evolution of New Partnership Applications, 2000 - 2008  
 
 
  
Source: California Long-Term Care Partnership Program, Connecticut Long-Term Care 
Partnership Program, Indiana Long-term Care Partnership Program, New York Long-
Term Care Partnership Program, 2012 
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Figure 2. Evolution of the Total New Number of Contracts between partnership and 
non-partnership states (2000 – 2008) 
 
 
  
Source: National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), 2012 
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Table 2: Total LTC Insurance Uptake per one million people age 65 and older (in 
logs) (NLTCI65it) – Baseline specification 
 
Panel A: OLS (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Panel A: OLS     
LTCPit  0.129** 0.077* 0.071   0.167*** 
 (0.046) (0.046)   (0.046) (0.349)   
LTCPit x POSTit -0.152** -0.147** -0.085 -0.153** 
 (0.058) (0.058) (0.089) (0.066) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes   Yes            No 
Linear Trend  No No No Yes 
Income  No Yes Yes Yes 
Competition and 
demographics 
No No 
Yes Yes 
Panel B: Fixed Effects                    (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
LTCPit 
0.344* 0.367* 0.344 28.396 
 (0.184) (0.204) (0.229) (28.137) 
LTCPit x POSTit 
-0.173** -0.175** -0.199** -0.172**  
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes   Yes 
           No 
Linear Trend  No No No Yes 
     
Income  No Yes Yes Yes 
Competition and 
demographics 
No No 
Yes Yes 
N = 459 (columns (1), (2), and (4); N = 423 (column (3))  
Standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Notes: The dependent variable, NLTCI65it, is a continuous variable denoting the log 
number of insured lives per one million people age 65 and older, and the mean and 
standard deviation are reported for each model. The right-hand side variables LTCP 
and POST have a binary interaction, as well as main effects for LTCP and YEAR 
effects. LTCP is a binary variable indicating status as a Partnership state (RWJF or 
Expansion). POST is binary variable indicating if the state actively has a Partnership 
program in the given year. YEAR is year effects with 2000 as the reference year. Panel 
A contains coefficients of OLS estimates. Panel B contains coefficients of fixed effects 
estimates.  The first column contains state level controls for logged GDP per capita,but 
no other right-hand side variables. Column (2) controls for competition and logged 
GDP per capita, Column (3) includes the same controls as column (2), but includes 
non-RWJF states only. Column (4) includes the same controls as column (2), but 
includes a linear time trend (TREND) rather than yearly time effects. 
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Table 3 Total LTC Insurance Uptake per one million people age 65 and older  on 
non-RWJF states (in logs)  
 (1)  (2)  
Panel A: OLS   
LTCPit  0.148** 0.344 
 (0.057)   (0.270) 
LTCPit x POSTit -0.468*** -0.315*** 
 (0.080)    (0.056) 
LTCPit x POSTit x YEAR2006 0.669** 0.392** 
 (0.280)   (0.170) 
LTCPit x POSTit x YEAR2007 0.290** 0.171* 
 (0.120)   (0.091) 
Constant 0.500 18.402*** 
 (1.615) (6.435) 
Controls Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects No Yes 
N = 423  
Standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Notes: The dependent variable, NLTCI65it, is a continuous variable denoting the log number of insured lives 
per one million people age 65 and older, and the mean and standard deviation are reported. The right-hand 
side variables LTCP and POST have a binary interaction, and there is a three-way interaction between LTCP, 
POST, and YEAR, as well as a main effects term for LTCP is included. LTCP is a binary variable indicating 
status as a Partnership state (RWJF or Expansion). POST is binary variable indicating if the state actively has 
a Partnership program in the given year. YEAR is year effects.  (1) reports  coefficients of OLS estimates. (2) 
reports  fixed effects estimates. The specification controls for competition, logged GDP per capita, and 
demographics (average state age and population). 
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Figure 3. Mean Premium Comparison: Partnership vs. Non-Partnership States 
 
 
 
Note: *Classification based on Partnership program status in the current year for which 
average is computed. 
Source: National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), 2012 
 
 
  
 $-
 $5,000
 $10,000
 $15,000
 $20,000
 $25,000
 $30,000
 $35,000
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Partnership*
Non-Partnership
 35 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 Robustness Checks: Total LTC Insurance Uptake per one million 
people age 65 and older  
(in logs) (NLTCI65it) – OLS, 2005-2008, 2000-2004 
  (1)  (2)  
Panel A: OLS, Non-RWJF 2005-2008 
LTCPit 0.082 0.031 
 (0.074) (0.068)   
LTCPit x POST -0.043 -0.043 
 (0.101) (0.097) 
YEAR2006 0.375*** 0.340*** 
 (0.094) (0.094) 
YEAR2007 -0.256** -0.309*** 
 (0.085) (0.088)   
YEAR2008 -0.292** -0.353*** 
 (0.099) (0.104) 
Constant -2.478 -4.882** 
 (1.720) (1.865) 
Panel B: OLS, Non-RWJF 2000-2004 
LTCPit  0.148** 0.089 
 (0.059) (0.061) 
YEAR2001 0.118 0.122 
 (0.097) (0.095)   
YEAR2002 0.189* 0.205** 
 (0.100) (0.099)   
YEAR2003 -0.220** -0.229** 
 (0.096)  (0.094)   
YEAR2004 -0.771*** -0.814*** 
 (0.096) (0.091)  
Constant 3.274** 1.268 
 (1.215) (1.498) 
   
State Income Yes Yes 
Competition and Demographics No Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
N = 188 (Panel A) N=16 (Panel B) 
Notes:  The dependent variable, NLTCI65it, is a continuous variable denoting the log number of insured 
lives per 10,000 people age 65 and older, and the mean and standard deviation are reported for each 
specification.  The coefficients in Panel A are for OLS estimates using the non-RWJF states for the period 
of 2005-2008. The coefficients in Panel B are for OLS estimates using the non-RWJF states from 2000-
2004 as a falsification test, examining the effect of the Partnership in years prior to implementation. Panel 
C contains an OLS estimate using year effects for RWJF only states. The right-hand side variables LTCP 
and POST have a binary interaction, and there is a main effects term for LTCP for Panels A and B. LTCP is 
a binary variable indicating status as a Partnership state (RWJF or Expansion). POST is binary variable 
indicating if the state actively has a Partnership program in the given year. YEAR is year effects. The first 
column contains state level controls for logged GDP per capita, but no other right-hand side variables. 
Column (2) controls for competition, logged GDP per capita, and demographics (average state age and 
population). 
 
 36 
 
Table 5: Partnership Policy Applications (including Purchases) per one million 
people age 65 and older (in logs) 
 (1)  (2) I (3)  (4)  
Panel A: OLS     
LTCPit  -.0382 -0.033 -0.019 0.009 
 (.0348) (0.031) (0.025) (0.009) 
LTCPit x POST 8.892*** 8.876*** 8.875*** 8.849*** 
 (0.236) (0.246) (0.246)  (0.272) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes   Yes No 
Time Trend No No No Yes 
State Income No Yes Yes Yes 
Competition and 
Demographics 
No No Yes 
Yes 
Note: N = 422 ( For RWJ states we observe data since the program inception) 
Standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Notes: The dependent variable a continuous variable denoting the log number of partnership policies and application per one 
million people age 65 and older, and the mean and standard deviation are reported for each specification. The right-hand side 
variables LTCP and POST have a binary interaction, and there is a main effects term for LTCP for Panels A and B. LTCP is a 
binary variable indicating status as a Partnership state (RWJF or Expansion). POST is binary variable indicating if the state 
actively has a Partnership program in the given year. YEAR is year effects, with 2000 as the reference year. Panel A contains 
coefficients of OLS estimates. Panel B contains coefficients of fixed effects estimates. The first column contains no state level 
controls. Column (2) controls for logged GDP per capita and logged average premiums, but no other right-hand side variables. 
Column (3) controls for competition, logged GDP per capita, and logged average premiums, demographics (average state age 
and population). Column (4) controls for the same variables as column (3), but replaces the year effects with a linear time trend 
(TREND). 
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Online Appendix 
 
 
 
APPENDIX A:  
 
Table A1. Long Term Care Partnership Models in the four RWJF states 
State First Year 
Operational 
Program 
Model 
Reciprocity Total 
Policies 
Purchased 
Total 
Policies 
Dropped 
Total 
Policies 
Denied 
California 1994 Dollar 
for 
Dollar 
No 142,474 as 
of 2011 Q1 
20,571 as of 
2011 Q1 
27,178 as 
of 2011 Q1 
Connecticut 1992 Dollar 
for 
Dollar 
Yes, with 
Indiana in 
2001; 
National 
Reciprocity 
Compact 
2009 
54,969 as 
of 2011 Q3 
Unavailable 8,809 as of 
2011 Q3 
Indiana 1993 Dollar 
for 
Dollar; 
hybrid 
model 
with 
Total 
Asset 
1998 
Yes, 
reciprocity 
with CT in 
2001; 
National 
Reciprocity 
Compact in 
2009 
52,070 as 
of 2011 Q4 
6,461 as of 
2011 Q4 
9,826 as of 
2011 Q4 
New York 1993 Total 
Asset; 
Dollar 
for 
Dollar 
2006 Q1 
Yes, 2012 95,702 as 
of 2011 Q2 
23,292 as of 
2011 Q2 
22,531 as 
of 2011 Q2 
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Table A2. Summary of previous literature 
 
Subject Author Results 
Partnership policyholder 
Income Level1 
Feder et al. (2007) CA, CT, IN majority greater 
than $350,000 in assets 
 
GAO (2007) CA, CT majority monthly 
household incomes $5,000+; 
53% of households with 
assets $350,000+; nationally 
only 36% of traditional LTC 
policyholders and only 17% 
without LTC insurance have 
assets $350,000+ 
 
CT OPM (2012) Cumulative, 44% policies 
sold to households with assets 
$350,000+ (not including 
home and car) 
 
Traditional policyholder age HIAA (2000); AHIP (2012) Average buyer age in 2000: 
67; average buyer age in 
2010: 59; non-buyer: 67 
 
Partnership policyholder age CPLTC (2011) Median age 59 
 
CT OPM (2012) Average age 58 
 
ILTCP (2011) Average age 61 
NYSPLTC (2011) Average age 60 
 
Market size Stevenson et al. (2010) Growth of 18% per year 
during 1987-2001; decline by 
9% per year from 2000-2005 
 
Stoltzfus and Feng (2011) Significant sales declines in 
2008 and 2009; sales increase 
18% 2010 
 
 
 
 
Appendix B: Data Appendix 
 
B.1. Dataset Sources: NAIC 
The principal source of data on the general long-term care insurance market is the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), which collects experience reports from 
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companies selling insurance in the US. For long-term care insurance, the purpose is to 
monitor the amount of long-term care coverage provided and compliance with lifetime loss 
ratio standards. The Long-Term Care Reporting Forms A through C are filed whenever 
long-term care insurance is sold, regardless of the category of annual statement that the 
company files, which can be Life, Accident and Health, Property and Casualty, Fraternal, 
and Health.  
 
Form C collects cumulative claim experience by state, and the reports from 2000 to 2008 
are one of the main components of the Private/Partnership Long-Term Care Insurance 
dataset used in this paper. Form C requires information on all long-term care insurance 
policies and contracts except for accelerated death benefit-type products (which is often 
the type of rider included in life insurance combined products). Long-term care insurance 
policies are those meeting the definition in the NAIC Long-Term Care Insurance Model 
Act or anything that would have met the definition in previous versions of the Model Act. 
The experience reported is the direct experience on all long-term care insurance policies 
and contracts issued within the state, including Partnership policies if the state considers 
them long-term care insurance at the time of the report. The experience reported in Form 
C is the experience in that statement year.  
 
The experience reported for each plan is broken down by calendar duration categories of 
0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5-9, 10+ years. Information for a plan of calendar duration 0 years applies to 
plans sold the same year as the statement form. Actual earned premiums and incurred 
claims are determined for each combination of calendar duration and calendar year of issue 
starting with the first year of issue; actual earned premiums are interest adjusted. Actual 
incurred claims are calculated by discounting appropriate claim payments and are adjusted 
for interest. The number of insured lives as of the end of the experience period is reported 
by calendar duration for each plan. Form C also contains information on policy type 
(individual or group), anticipated earned premiums, anticipated incurred claims, policy 
reserves, and the company identification code (NAIC 2009).  
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The data purchased from the NAIC was originally broken into four categories of company 
reports by year: Fraternal, Health, Life, and Property and Casualty. The first step was to 
label the columns within the .csv files and convert them into .xls files. We then combined 
the spreadsheets within each category into one single spreadsheet with data from 2000 to 
2009. We imported the .xls files into Stata 12.1, and combined them into a single data file 
that contained all of the Form C data across all years. We sorted the data file by state, 
company code, and year. Then we order to isolate the policies newly active each year, and 
used the line number variable to create a calendar duration variable that corresponds to the 
calendar duration indicated in the text version of Form C. We dropped all observations 
except those in which the calendar duration equals zero. At this point it became clear that 
it would not be possible to separate out plans newly in force in 2009, so all 2009 
observations were dropped from the dataset.19 We consolidated the dataset by collapsing 
the number of insured lives variable by year and state, and then dropped all observations 
except for the 50 US states and the District of Columbia. 
 
The key variables in the dataset from the NAIC reports are: Year, NLTCI (number of 
insured lives at end of experience period), PREMIUMS (average actual incurred 
premiums), and NCom (number of companies earning premiums or paying out benefits).  
  
B.2. Partnership Programs 
 
B.2.1 California 
The quarterly reports issued by the California Partnership for Long-Term Care (CPLTC) 
program provided data on California from 2000 to 2008. The reports include information 
on participating insurers, quarterly and cumulative statistics, maximum benefit amounts, 
policyholder age, trends, policyholders and asset protection earned, and service utilization. 
The reports were obtained from the CPLTC website (CPLTC 2008). 
 
B.2.2 Connecticut 
                                                 
19 In 2009 the NAIC introduced a new set of forms to replace Forms A through C, in order to shift the 
reporting focus to monitoring assumptions about morbidity and persistency. Form 5 is the corresponding 
replacement for Form C; it includes data on earned premiums, incurred claims, and policies in force at the 
end of the year (NAIC 2012a). 
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Data for Connecticut was gathered from the Annual Progress Reports on the Connecticut 
Partnership for Long-Term Care from 2000 to 2008. These reports provide information on 
agent training and outreach, public forums, public relations activities, outreach to 
associations and employers, program reciprocity, outreach to nursing facilities, 
presentations and media coverage, and summary statistics. The reports were obtained 
courtesy of David Guttchen of the Connecticut Partnership for Long-Term Care, along with 
Annual Program Evaluations (CT OPM 2008).  
 
B.2.3 Indiana 
The quarterly reports issued by the Indiana Long-Term Care Program (ILTCP) provide the 
data on Indiana’s program from 2000 to 2008. The reports include summary statistics, 
statistics on policyholders in benefits, claimant profiles, and age distributions. The reports 
were obtained from the ILTCP and Indiana Department of Insurance (ILTCP 2008). 
 
B.2.4 New York 
Quarterly reports issued by the NYSPLTC provided the main source of data on the New 
York program. The quarterly reports contain information on participating insurers, 
summary statistics, age distribution, and policy features. However, reports were only 
available covering the time period of Q1 2000 to Q2 2007. The data for the first half of 
2007 is doubled to obtain full estimates for 2007 in the primary dataset (NYSPLTC 2007). 
 
We created .xls files with information from each of the states’ reports, and then imported 
the spreadsheets into Stata 12.1. The four files were appended into a single Stata data file, 
which were merged into the primary dataset.  
 
The key variables from the original four Partnership programs include: Apps_Received 
(number of Partnership applications received) and Policied_Purchased (number of 
Partnership policies purchased). Policies_Purchased and Apps_Received combine to form 
LTCPA.  
 
B.3. Population 
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The primary source of population data is the US Census Bureau. The state resident 
populations are drawn from the Annual Estimates of the Resident Population by Sex and 
Age for each state, covering April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2009 (U.S. Census Bureau Population 
Division 2010a). The population estimates for the US are from the Annual Estimates of the 
Resident Population by Sex and Selected Age Groups for the United States: April 1, 2000 
to July 1, 2009 (U.S. Census Bureau Population Division 2010b). The individual .xls files 
were downloaded from the Census Bureau and imported into Stata. After appending the 
state and US data files, all groups were removed except for total population (Total_Pop), 
65 and older (_65_older). These variables were merged with the primary dataset and used 
to create a number of variables weighted by population.  
 
We calculated the percentage of people in each age group (total population, 65 and older) 
with private long-term care insurance, e.g. NLTCI65 is the total number of insured lives 
per one million people age 65 and older in logs.  
 
 
B.4. Medicaid 
Medicaid expenditure data comes from Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) 
data on state health expenditures by state of residence (CMS 2011). We use these estimates 
instead of expenditure by state of provider because per capita estimates are only appropriate 
when using state of residence estimates. We merged the total expenditure variable 
(Medicaid_Exp) with the primary dataset.  
 
B.5. GDP 
Per capita real GDP by state (chained 2005 dollars) comes from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA 2012). We merged the state GDP per capita variable (GDP) into the 
primary dataset. For the logarithmic model, we take the log of GDP per capita (lgdp). 
 
B.6. Expansion Partnership Programs 
The Long-Term Care Partnership Program Technical Assistance website operated by 
Truven Health Analytics for HHS provided information on the expansion Partnership 
programs (Truven Health Analytics 2012). We use the state reports to help code the dummy 
 43 
variable (LTCP) on Partnership status to equal 1 if the state has a Partnership program in 
effect that year, and to equal 0 if it does not; this variable includes both original RWJF and 
expansion Partnership programs. 
Appendix C. 
 
Figure C1. Partnership policies purchased by 10,0000 in RWJF States 
California, Connecticut, Indiana, New York 
 
 
 
 
Source: National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), 2012 
 
 
 
Figure C2. Percentage of partnership policies purchased in RWJF Partnership 
States 
California, Connecticut, Indiana, New York 
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Appendix D: State Introduction of Partnership Program (State Plan Amendment 
Passage) 
 
State Year 
CT 1992 
IN 1993 
NY 1993 
CA 1994 
ID 2006 
MN 2006 
NE 2006 
FL 2007 
GA 2007 
KS 2007 
MD 2007 
MO 2007 
MT 2007 
ND 2007 
NH 2007 
NJ 2007 
NV 2007 
OH 2007 
PA 2007 
SD 2007 
VA 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
